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Abstract
Data privacy studies methods, tools, and theory to avoid the disclosure
of sensitive information. Its origin is in Statistics with the goal to ensure
the confidentiality of data gathered from census and questionnaires. The
topic was latter introduced in computer science and more particularly in
data mining, where due to the large amount of data currently available,
has attracted the interest of researchers, practitioners, and companies. In
this paper we will review the main topics related to data privacy, and
privacy-enhancing technologies.
1 Introduction
Data privacy and privacy-enhancing technologies study techniques and tools
to avoid the unintentional disclosure of sensitive information. They have been
studied in the areas of computer science and statistics. Statistical Disclosure
Control (SDC) was developed first, to solve the needs of statistical offices to
publish data from census and questionnaires avoiding confidentiality problems.
Within computer science, tools for data privacy have been developed in relation
to communications, security, databases, and data mining. Tools and methods
related to communications and security are often classified as privacy-enhancing
technologies (PET) while the ones related to data mining are studied in privacy-
preserving data mining (PPDM). While there exist these different communities
focusing on different types of applications and data uses, background and con-
cepts, as well as some methods are common.
In this overview we will discuss the main concepts and tools in data privacy,
giving a general perspective of the field and presenting them independently of
∗Postprint of: Vicenc¸ Torra, Guillermo Navarro-Arribas, Data Privacy, Wiley Interdisci-
plinary Reviews: Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, Volume 4, Issue 4, 2014, Pages:
269-340, ISSN:1942-4795. https://doi.org/10.1002/widm.1129
1
the community in which they were originated. This is a broad and relatively
non-technical description intended for readers without a strong background in
the field. We provide, through the paper, several references which should allow
the interested reader to get a deeper understanding in specific topics of the field.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we will present a classifica-
tion of the methods for data privacy. We will review different dimensions. In
particular, we will see that one of the dimensions is about the subjects involved
in the data privacy process: the respondent, the owner, and the user. We will
focus then on user-privacy, methods to be implemented and used by the users
of a system to ensure their own privacy. Then, we will focus on respondent and
owner privacy. The paper finishes with some conclusions and some references
for further study.
2 Classification
The literature presents different classifications of the methods for data pri-
vacy [3, 21, 23, 34, 55, 84, 90, 93]. In this section we review three of these
classifications. We will use them as different dimensions to classify and review
the main methods. The three dimensions are as follows.
• On whose privacy is being sought. In the whole process of data
collection, data protection, and data analysis several subjects (individuals
or entities) are involved. This dimension focuses on the subject whose
privacy is considered the main motivation for the application of a method.
Three subjects are considered: respondent, owner, and user.
• On the computations to be done. Data are protected for a certain
use. That is, for the application of a certain algorithm or to do some
type of analysis. In this dimension, methods are distinguished according
to the type of computation or analysis a data miner (or another user) will
perform with the protected data. For example, before data protection we
may know that clustering algorithms will be applied to the data, and this
can help on the selection of an appropriate method for data protection.
• On the number of data sources. Data have to be protected, and
then used. It is different when a single data set is considered and when
a collection of data sets are considered. This dimension focuses on the
number of such data sets.
We discuss these dimensions in more detail in the sections that follow. Fig-
ure 1 outlines the classification.
2.1 On whose privacy is being sought
As enumerated above, in the data privacy protection process we typically con-
sider three subjects. They are the respondent, the owner, and the user. We
describe their specific meaning below.
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Figure 1: Classification of methods for data privacy based on three dimensions.
• The respondent. Following the terminology in statistical disclosure con-
trol, the respondent is the person whose data have been collected and are
in the database.
• The owner. Data from respondents are collected and stored by a com-
pany or an administration who is the holder of the data, liable for disclo-
sure of confidential information, and possibly with economic interest on
the data. This is the owner of the data.
• The user. When a person accesses a system (e.g., a database, a search
engine, or an email system) some trails are left which can be recorded
in a secondary database or sniffed and used or disclosed later on. From
a certain point of view, the user is just a respondent of this secondary
database. Nevertheless, we distinguish the user from a respondent when
the user can perform some actions against the system or sniffers. That is,
the user corresponds to an individual that can act to avoid disclosure of
his own information, i.e., an active subject, while a respondent is a passive
subject almost a strange to his own data.
We can consider data privacy focusing on the three subjects discussed above.
That is, we can consider respondent privacy, owner privacy, and user privacy.
This dimension is based on the one in [19].
• Respondent privacy. It focuses on technologies that avoid the disclosure
of sensitive information about the respondents of a database. Some specific
goals of respondent privacy are to avoid that data are linked to a particular
individual, to avoid increasing the knowledge about particular individuals,
and to avoid that someone can find that a particular individuals’ data is
in a database.
• Owner privacy. It focuses on tools to avoid the disclosure of information
that is relevant to the owner of the database. On the one hand this
information can be information on particular individuals, as in respondent
privacy. On the other hand, this information can be knowledge that can
only be inferred from the whole database. An example of the later is when
a database owner pretends to publish a database but avoiding that third
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parties are able to mine certain rules which are of high relevance in the
business.
• User privacy. As stated above, the role of users is similar to the one
of respondents in the fact that their data are collected. The difference is
that here users can act to protect their privacy. Therefore, user privacy
focus on tools that can be implemented and used by users. For example,
to avoid leaving trails on their interests when accessing a search engine.
We have two sections below, one titled “User privacy” and the other titled
“Respondent and owner privacy”.
2.2 On the computations to be done
Data are protected to be used by third parties. If we know how data will be
used, and what the third party wants to compute we can take that into account
in the data protection process. For example, we may know that a statistician
wants to apply a linear regression of income with respect to age or know that
a data miner will apply some non supervised machine learning algorithm (e.g.,
some clustering algorithms).
In this dimension we consider three situations. We describe them below.
• Computation-driven or specific-purpose data privacy protection
methods. In this case, we know which type of algorithm a researcher will
apply to the data, and we can tailor the protected data to this type of
method.
• Data-driven or general-purpose data privacy protection meth-
ods. This corresponds to the case in which there is only rough informa-
tion or no information at all on the type of analysis to apply to the data.
This is the case when data are published in the web.
• Result-driven data protection privacy methods. In this case we
know the analysis that the researcher will do on the data. Nevertheless,
there is a fundamental difference with computation-driven methods be-
cause protection is not focused on the original database but on the results
obtained from the analysis. That is, we want to avoid that the data miner
or statistician gets some particular results. The case described above in
which we want to avoid a data miner to obtain a certain association rule
from the data belongs to this case.
We can find in the literature another classification (dimension) of methods
distinguishing perturbative and cryptographic methods. Perturbative methods
are those that add some kind of noise to the data. That is, they mask the
original data so that the true values are no longer found. Examples are adding
noise or swapping values of the data. In this way, disclosure risk is reduced at
the cost of some information (or utility) loss. On the contrary, cryptographic
methods describe protocols so that researchers get their desired result without
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accessing to the original data. Most perturbative methods can be considered
as data-driven while cryptographic methods can be considered as computation-
driven. The latter can only be defined when we know which is the intended
computation of the user.
We will discuss in more detail these methods later in relation to respondent
and owner privacy.
2.3 On the number of data sources
The number of data sources is another way to distinguish data privacy protection
methods. There are methods to be applied when we only want to publish a single
data set, when we want to publish different data sets (e.g. multiple tables of
a single database), and when we want to obtain a computation from multiple
data sets.
Methods focused on the publication of a single data set typically correspond
to data-driven methods. The same case occurs when a single owner publishes
several data sets (see e.g. [73, 57, 58]). A concrete case of this last scenario cor-
responds to the protection of stream or dynamic data. Protecting data streams
can be done by producing several protected data sets in a timely basis or pro-
viding incremental versions of the data set [46, 10, 100, 9]. Dynamic data, which
also considers deletion of elements, produces an evolving protected data set that
reflects the updates (deletions and/or insertions) in the original data [87, 97].
Computation driven methods can be applied if the analysis of the data miner
or statistician is known.
The case of computing a function from multiple data sets typically cor-
responds to computation-driven methods. In fact, most computation-driven
methods focus on the following type of problem: n data owners decide to com-
pute a function f of their data so that the only additional knowledge each of
the owners get after the computation of f is the outcome of f applied to their
data. Cryptographic protocols are defined for this purpose [89].
An important advantage of cryptographic methods is that they compute
the function exactly (there is no error in the outcome of the function) and
they ensure complete privacy. The main inconvenience is that if the function
is changed, the protocol has to be changed. This is so, even in the case of
a small variation in the function. So, the main disadvantage is that there is
no flexibility on the function to be computed. In some scenarios there might
be also computational or communication costs, since cryptographic operations
have to be performed through a communication protocols in a reasonable time.
On the contrary, data-driven (perturbative) methods are not exact because they
decrease risk by adding some noise into the data, and this causes a perturbation
in the results of any analysis, and in addition they do not ensure 100% privacy.
The risk depends on the amount and type of perturbation added into the data.
However, these methods permit the use of the same data to compute different
functions. So, the main advantage is flexibility.
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3 User privacy
As stated above, user privacy focuses on methods that can be implemented and
applied by the user to ensure his own privacy. We can distinguish two main
families of methods:
• Methods to protect the identity of the user.
• Methods to protect the data generated by the user.
Tools for anonymous communications belong to user privacy. These tools
are expected to be implemented by the user to avoid the disclosure of some
information related to him. For example, when a user A sends a message m to
user B, A may want to avoid that third parties know that he is the sender of m,
or hide the content of m (or try to keep others unaware that he sent a message
after all).
Tools for user privacy have also been developed in the context of querying
databases or search engines. In this case if A queries a search engine Y with
query q, we may have the case that we want to avoid Y to know who is the
sender of the query, and the case in which Y knows that A is the sender but is
not aware of the query q.
We will give some examples of these tools in the next two sections.
3.1 Methods to protect the identity of the user
In the context of communication, we have anonymous communication mech-
anisms in which the sender of the message (or, in general, the origin of the
communication) is not disclosed. Mix networks [12], onion routing [64] and
crowds [65] are examples of such systems.
In the context of querying databases, this problem is studied in anonymous
database search. One approach to this problem is allowing users to submit
queries in behalf of other users. P2P UPIR (Peer-to-peer User Private Informa-
tion Retrieval) [70, 71, 11, 91, 66] follows this approach. Cryptography is used
to define communities of users, and communication spaces.
3.2 Methods to protect the data generated by the user
In the context of communication, cryptographic mechanisms are used to protect
the content of the messages. In addition to that, there are systems developed to
ensure unobservability, i.e. that third parties do not even know that a message
is sent, for example, we have dining cryptographer networks [13].
Private information retrieval (PIR) studies this type of problems in the con-
text of querying databases. Informally, this problem can be stated as finding
a way to retrieve an element of a database without the database being able to
deduce which element is of interest to the user.
Information Theoretic PIR faces this problem considering the case in which
there is no privacy breach even in the case of an unlimited computing power.
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However, it has been proven that if we consider a single database, all information
theoretic PIR schemes require Ω(n) bits of information (where n is the number
of records in the database). This means (see [16]) that essentially the only thing
that the user can do to avoid the database to know his query is to ask for a
copy of the whole database.
Because of this theoretical result different alternatives have been considered
in the literature. We review some of them below.
First, within the information theoretic PIR the literature considers solutions
in which instead of a single database there are replicated copies of this database.
Then, the user queries differently each of the copies and from the results of the
queries obtains the desired result. In this case, solutions sublinear in n, exist.
Some of the solutions are resistant to coalitions of databases. That is, even in
the case a certain number of databases collude they will not be able to find out
which is the query of the user. See e.g. [16].
Another approach is computational PIR (cPIR). In this case, a server with
a limited computational capacity is considered. [14] and [40] are two of the
proposed solutions for cPIR.
A third approach is the use of trusted-hardware. See e.g. [99] and [96] on
trusted-hardware PIR.
These three approaches are based on cryptographic tools and ensure no pri-
vacy leakage. Another approximation consists on methods that mask the real
query in a set of other queries. This is the case of GooPIR [20] and Track-
MeNot [33] or [77, 92]. They add to the query, either at the query level or at
the session level, additional terms with the goal that the server cannot distin-
guish the real queries of the user among the added ones. This query obfuscation
approach can however be attacked by analyzing the user query history from the
server side. In [62] authors can re-identify users from their obfuscated queries
by using common classifiers and clustering techniques on the user query history.
DisPA (for Dissociating Privacy Agent) [35, 36] follows another approach,
also to protect the data generated by the user. In this case, the system (a
plug-in for Firefox) generates different identities for a given user, and then
distributes the queries among the identities. The basis of this system is to
consider that what makes a user unique is the union of all queries. Therefore,
the disaggregation of queries permits to keep the profile of the user unknown to
the search engine. Disaggregation of queries is done according to topics, so if
a user often queries about data privacy, Japanese recipes, and sports/squash it
will result that the search engine will just know that there are three individuals
one interested on data privacy, another on Japanese recipes and a third one
about Sports/squaix.
4 Respondent and owner privacy
According to what has been described in the previous sections, we have that
respondent and owner privacy are typically implemented by the owner of a
database. According to our discussion on the dimensions about the computa-
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tions to be done and the number of sources, we have that there are the following
typical scenarios in respondent and owner privacy.
• Result-driven methods (mainly used in owner privacy). Given a database
D, a data mining algorithm A, and a certain knowledge K that we do not
want to disclose, the goal is to modify D into D′ so that the algorithm
A cannot infer K from D′. [4] is an overview on this topic, and [30, 31]
describe algorithms in the case that A are rule mining algorithms.
• Computation-driven methods with the typical scenario with several
data sources belonging to different data owners. This scenario corresponds
to owner privacy. As described above, this type of problem is solved
defining cryptographic protocols for the specific function the owners want
to compute. [89] describes several computation-driven methods and [37]
is a survey on methods for horizontally partitioned data (i.e., different
owners have data on different individuals but on the same variables.
• Computation-driven methods with a single database release. If the
function is completely specified, the most common scenario is when re-
searchers can access to a database and send specific queries (see e.g. [24]).
If the function is not completely specified but it is known that the user
applies e.g. clustering, then data-driven approaches would be applied with
particular emphasis on methods that behave well with respect to this use
(clustering). There are studies (see e.g., [41]) comparing different data-
driven methods with respect to clustering, supervised learning algorithms,
and so on.
• Data-driven either with one or multiple data releases. As already
cited in a previous section [73, 9, 57, 58] focus on data-driven approaches
of multiple data releases or streaming data. Data-driven approaches for a
single database are further discussed in the next section.
4.1 Data-driven methods
As described above, data-driven methods, usually referred as masking methods,
are appropriate when we do not know before hand what type of analysis will be
applied to the data. Given a database D, the usual way to proceed is to modify
D into D′ so that the risk of disclosure decreases while at the same time we
preserve the utility of D. That is, modify D into D′ so that the disclosure risk
decreases while keeping information loss as low as possible. Note that we use
the term information loss as a computation oriented definition of data utility
when referring to data utility. More information loss means less utility of the
data once it is masked.
Due to the fact that these methods are not disclosure risk free, several dis-
closure risk measures have been considered in the literature to quantify the risk
in D′. At the same time, as the modification of D can decrease the utility of
the database, some information loss measures have been defined to measure the
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extent of this loss. Naturally, disclosure risk decreases at the expenses of some
information loss. Then, a good privacy method is the one that modifies D into
D′ in such a way that the disclosure risk is very low and the information loss is
also very low.
As a summary, we have that research in data-driven methods needs to focus
on masking methods, disclosure risk measures and utility measures. We will
discuss in the following three sections: disclosure risk measures, information
loss measures, and data masking methods.
4.2 Disclosure risk and some definitions of privacy for
data-driven methods
In this section we describe several approaches to measure the degree of privacy
provided by a given method. This measures are normally referred as disclosure
risk measures, or presented as privacy properties to be satisfied by the protected
data.
4.2.1 Properties for disclosure risk
Data-driven methods add noise to the data to avoid disclosure. Then, we can
either consider risk as a boolean condition that is either satisfied or not satisfied,
or as a measurable (non-boolean) condition and define measures of risk.
Differential privacy [24] and k-anonymity [76, 75, 80, 79] follow this first
approach. That is, they define conditions in which we say that the file satisfies
our requirements of privacy. At the same time, such definitions permit to define
algorithms that given a privacy condition only focus on the minimization of
information loss.
The k-anonymity property ensures that in a protected data set there are at
least k records indistinguishable from each other. Or, from the point of view of
re-identification, that the probability of re-identifying and individual from the
data set is 1/k. This property is very common in statistical data like census,
where the perturbation is applied to attributes known as quasi-identifiers (they
cannot be used to re-identify an individual by themselves, but their union might
be), and sensitive attributes are left without perturbation. Example of quasi-
identifiers can be age, sex, or postal code, while typical sensitive attributes are
salary or disease. Consider a k-anonymous data set, where the set of k records
sharing the same quasi-identifiers (known as anonymity set), also have the same
sensitive attribute. Although the table might not be used to directly re-identify
a given individual it leaks information about the sensitive attribute. That is
an attacker will know the sensitive attribute of the individual knowing to which
anonymity set it belongs. This is a well known problem of k-anonymity (see [17]
for a detailed description of the problem and discussion of current solutions). To
address this issue several properties have emerged. l-diversity [47] requires at
least l well represented values of the sensitive attribute in each anonymity set.
Moreover t-closeness [45] requires the distribution of sensitive attributes to be
close to their distribution in the overall data set. In this same line, p-sensitivity
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has also been defined as the concrete case of l-diversity where the number of
values for each sensitive attribute is at least p for each anonymity set. See [88]
for a review of p-sensitive k-anonymity models.
Some generalizations of k-anonymity have been defined in the literature. E.g.
k-confusion [74] and probabilistic k-anonymity [69], in which instead of require-
ing indistiguishable records the focus is on the probability of re-identification. k-
concealment [81] requires computationally indistinguishable records (each record
can be matched with k − 1 generalized records).
Differential privacy states that adding or removing an item from a data set
does not significantly affect the outcome of any analysis. That is, the outcomes
should be probabilisitically similar. This definition of privacy has boosted a
great number of literature on mechanisms to provide differential privacy [15],
but it has also raised some concerns. E.g. [68, 5] question the practicality of
differential privacy as a general case approach for data privacy.
4.2.2 Disclosure risk measures
As an alternative to boolean conditions, there are measures of disclosure risk
defined under the premise that risk is not binary but a measurable condition.
Then, it has sense to consider different levels of risk and the trade-off of the risk
with respect to the utility of the data. In this setting, the problem is not to
define algorithms with the only purpose of optimizing information loss but with
the purpose of finding a good trade-off between information loss and disclosure
risk. Therefore, from an optimization point of view, we have a multi-objective
(two-objective) optimization problem instead of a minimization problem. The
perspective of an optimization problem has been exploited in e.g. [48, 67].
Some of the measures of disclosure risk are based on the concept of unique-
ness, and on re-identification algorithms. Key references on disclosure risk based
on uniqueness are [26, 25] and based on re-identification algorithms are [94,
22, 86]. Disclosure risk measures based on re-identification algorithms model
the scenario in which intruders use their knowledge (represented in terms of a
database) to attack the published data set. In this case, the intruders will try to
link their data with the one in the data set by means of the best available tech-
nology for database integration (re-identification algorithms, schema matching
and record linkage algorithms). This approach is flexible enough to cope with
a large number of scenarios. For example, disclosure risk has been studied for
masked data [98], synthetic data [85, 94], and for the case in which the intruder
and the protected data are not using the same variables [82, 83] or are using
different terms (e.g. ontology-base record linkage in [49]).
As a general purpose estimation of the disclosure risk, re-identification can be
attempted on the protected data set assuming the knowledge of all the attributes
from the original data set. For example by applying record linkage between the
original records and the same protected records. This approach was introduced
in [78], and widely used afterwards [94, 42, 95, 85]. The percentage of re-
identification is used as a generic index of disclosure risk, that can be used to
compare different masking methods [22]. A parametrized record linkage allows
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to provide an upper bound index of re-identification by finding the optimal
distance between records (one that provides the highest re-identification index)
using machine learning techniques [2].
Disclosure risk based on re-identification methods can also be used to model
the case in which the intruder uses information about the data masking process
to attack the data. That is, in case that an institution publishes a data set
giving information on the algorithm applied and the parameters used, we can
use this information to attack more effectively the data. This has been proven
to be effective in [59, 60, 61] in the case that data was protected using rank
swapping and microaggregation. Methods resistant to this type of attacks are
needed for the sake of transparency [38].
4.3 Utility and information loss measures
Utility measures are used to measure in what extent the protected database
diverges from the original one for some statistics and analysis. We can measure
the utility of the data once it is masked as compared to the original one. This
measure can be given in terms of the loss of information produced by the masking
method. A masking method that yields a higher loss of information will present
lower utility. Then, given a database D, a protected database D′, and a certain
analysis f , an information loss measure is a function
ILf (D,D′) = divergence(f(D), f(D′)),
where divergence is a way to compare the result of the analysis f on D and D′.
Naturally, the function divergence should be zero when D = D′, and increas-
ing the more f(D) and f(D′) differ.
We can distinguish between generic utility (or information loss) measures and
specific utility (or information loss) measures. We have specific utility measures
when they focus on particular uses of the data. This would be the case if we
consider clustering as a data use, and then we use clustering algorithms and
functions to compare partitions to define an information loss measure. This
is the case in [41]. Otherwise, we have generic utility measures when we e.g.
aggregate some statistics of the data. This latter approach is used in [51, 21].
4.4 Masking methods
Data masking methods are typically classified in three main classes. See [23, 34]
for detailed descriptions of the methods.
• Perturbative methods. Given a database D, these methods modify the
database adding some noise to D. This can be modeled as follows:
D′ = D + .
There are several perturbative methods. The simplest one is noise ad-
dition where the error to be added to D follows a normal distribution.
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Most important methods are noise addition [8], multiplicative noise [39],
microaggregation (applicable to all types of data) [18], rank swapping (for
data in ordinal or numerical scales) [52], and PRAM (for ordinal or cate-
gorical scales) [29].
• Non-perturbative methods. Given a database, these methods modify
the database changing the level of detail of the data but not introducing
errors to the data. One masking method is generalization, which replaces a
category by a more general one (e.g., town is replaced by county), another
one is suppression (suppression can be considered as equivalent to a gener-
alization to the most general category), and finally we have discretization
in the case of numerical data (again, a kind of generalization).
• Synthetic data generators. Instead of publishing the original data, we
generate a model of the data and then replace the original values by the
outcomes of the model. This approach can be considered as a kind of
perturbative method.
All the methods described here have been used, and compared in terms of
their trade-off between information loss and disclosure risk (defined in terms
of re-identification algorithms). In the case of using differential privacy as a
standard to ensure risk, the most common masking method is to use Laplace
noise. See e.g. [24] for details. In the case of using k-anonymity as the standard
for risk, the most common masking method is generalization and suppression.
See e.g. [43, 44, 79] for details. Note that such methods focus on numerical data
for differential privacy and categorical data for k-anonymity.
5 Discussion
For details in the topics presented in this paper, the reader can look to the
following books [23, 34, 89, 93] and also to the material in the web page [102].
[23, 34, 93] follow a SDC perspective, while [89] a PPDM perspective. In ad-
dition, [55, 84] focus on some specific topics. [55] is a survey on the use of
information fusion techniques in data privacy, mainly focusing on the use of
aggregation functions and record linkage techniques. [84] focuses on the use
of explicit knowledge (either in the data privacy protection process or in re-
identification).
We have discussed the main topics related to data privacy. Although the
discussion is general and independent on the type of data used, research is not.
Initial research in the field focused on standard databases with either numerical
and categorical data. Further research has been done in longitudinal/time-
series data [1], and there are more recent trends on data privacy for (search)
logs [56, 63, 54, 7, 27], locations [32, 50], and graphs [72, 101].
Research in these areas follow the same lines discussed here. There is re-
search on online social networks that focus on respondent and owner privacy,
while there is other research focusing on user’s perspective (i.e., user-privacy).
12
There are perturbative approaches (e.g. to avoid re-identification) and non-
perturbative approaches (e.g. to achieve k-anonymity) for online social net-
works, and also results to achieve differential privacy in online social networks.
Similarly, there are also such lines of research in location privacy, or in methods
for search logs.
In any case, the development of methods has to take into account the speci-
ficities of the data. Ignoring them can cause disclosure as an intruder can use
such vulnerabilities to attack the data. Some of the scandals [6, 53] in privacy
have been due to a lack of understanding of these specificities (e.g., different
logs from the same person, which alone are not sensitive, can be combined to
re-identify this person).
The data privacy research and application field is gaining popularity and
there is a growing community interested in advancing the research field. There
are open issues and research fields specially active: data privacy techniques for
very large datasets, including stream data is becoming important as the data
processing capabilities are rapidly increasing. Moreover, the interest of other
research areas in data privacy is also becoming very relevant, examples are
machine learning, or game theory.
In this paper we have presented a review of the main techniques related
with data privacy. We have presented the main dimensions that permit to
classify data privacy protection methods, we have enumerated some of them,
and discussed the main concepts in the area.
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